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creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/Abstract Introduction: Management choices at the end of life are high-stake decisions
fraught with emotions, chief among is regret. Our objective in this paper is to test the utility
of a regret-based model to facilitate referral to hospice care while helping patients clarify their
preferences on how they wish to spend the remaining days of their lives.
Methods: A prospective cohort study that enrolled consecutive adult patients (nZ 178) aware
of the terminal nature of their disease. The patients were at the point in care where they had to
decide between continuing potentially ‘curative/life-prolonging’ treatment (Rx) versus hospice
care. Preferences were elicited using a Dual Visual Analog Scale regarding the level of regret of
omission versus commission (RgO/RgC) towards hospice care and Rx. Each patient’s RgO/
RgC was contrasted against the predictive probability of death to suggest a management plan,
which was then compared with the patient’s actual choice. The probability of death was esti-
mated using validated Palliative Performance Scale predictive model.
Results: Eighty-five percent (151/178) of patients agreed with the model’s recommendations
(p < 0.000001). Model predicted the actual choices for 72% (128/178) of patients
(p < 0.00001). Logistic regression analysis showed that people who were initially inclined to
be referred to hospice and were predicted to choose hospice over disease-directed treatment
by the regret model have close to 98% probability of choosing hospice care at the end of their
lives. No other factors (age, gender, race, educational status and pain level) affected their
choice.B. Downs Blvd, MDC02 Tampa, FL, 33612, USA.
.edu (B. Djulbegovic).
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B. Djulbegovic et al. / European Journal of Cancer 68 (2016) 27e3728Conclusions: Using regret to elicit choices in the end-of-life setting is both descriptively and
prescriptively valid. People with terminal disease who are initially inclined to choose hospice
and do not regret such a choice will select hospice care with high level of certainty.
ª 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Evaluation of the quality of decision making in the end-
of-life setting over the last two decades continues to
show that it is woefully inadequate [1e3]. There is
widespread consensus that for the care of patients with a
terminal illness would improve if the patients were
provided with an accurate assessment of their prognosis,
risks and benefits of the alternative management options
(e.g. timely referral to hospice/palliative care versus
continued treatment targeted at underlying disease), and
have their true values, wishes and preferences elicited to
enable them to pass the remaining time of their lives on
their own terms [1]. Such practice is legally mandated in
New York and California [4], and since January 1, 2016
the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services has begun
to reimburse providers for advance, end-of-life care
planning discussions for Medicare beneficiaries [5].
However, the problem related to poor end-of-life care is
not ‘what’ [needs to be done to improve quality of care
of terminally ill patients] but ‘how’ [that can be ach-
ieved]. Practitioners and patients lack reliable tools that
are fully integrated within the clinical workflow, that are
capable of relating the patients’ prognosis (life expec-
tancy, probability of survival/death) to the patients’
preferences to enable their true informed choices at the
end of life.
Modern cognitive science increasingly accepts dual
processing explanation of human cognition, according
to which medical decisions can be truly consistent with
patients’ values and preferences only if they take into
account both affect-based (type 1) and analytical (type
2) cognitive processing [6,7,8]. The extent to which one
process dominates over another depends on the context
of a decision situation [9]. Decisions at the end of life are
arguably the most consequential decisions that any
human has to make. These are high-stake decisions
fraught with emotions. To date, however, elicitation of
patient preferences in the end-of-life setting has typically
relied on analytical reasoning using hypothetical
vignette scenarios without an explicit attempt to tap into
the emotional domain that characterizes the nature of
terminal illness [1,10]. Frequently, a patient in the ter-
minal phase of his or her life has to decide whether to
forgo potentially life-prolonging treatment, or to accept
a peaceful death that may involve hospice services.
Facing such a decision, patient preferences become
dominated by emotions, chief among which is regret[10,11]. Because regret is a unique human emotion (i.e.
type 1 process), which involves counterfactual de-
liberations (i.e. quintessential type 2 processes), we have
previously proposed that regret, as a cognitive emotion,
can activate both cognitive domains by serving as a link
between type 1 and type 2 processes [8,12,13]. Theoret-
ically, elicitation of (anticipatory) regret of omission
(e.g. failure to be referred to hospice care) versus regret
of commission (e.g. wrongly referred to hospice) can be
linked to the estimates of the patient’s prognosis
(e.g. probability of death within certain time frame) via
the regret threshold model [10,11,14e16]. According to
the threshold model, a patient should accept referral to
hospice if the probability of death within the time of
interest is greater than the threshold probability at
which the patient is indifferent between the hospice
referral versus continuing treatment [10,11,17]. In this
paper, we report the application of the regret threshold
model to facilitate preference-based choices in the end-
of-life setting. We demonstrate both descriptive and
prescriptive validity of the model, which can be easily
integrated within the workflow of a typical medical
practice.
2. Methods
2.1. Eligibility criteria
All terminally ill patients (or their proxies) older than 18
years who were aware of the terminal nature of their
disease were eligible for the study. Patients had to be at a
point in their treatment plan when they were deciding
between either continuing current treatment targeted at
their disease (potentially ‘curative/life-prolonging’
treatment), or hospice care. The goal of the study was to
a) help patients clarify their choices and b) assess
whether the actual choices agreed with the predicted
choices.
2.2. Study design
This was a prospective study in which consecutive pa-
tients meeting eligibility criteria were approached in
Tampa General Hospital and H. Lee Moffitt Cancer
Center & Research Institute, Tampa, Florida by regis-
tered nurses. Fig. 1 shows the study flow. We used two
validated and widely used models to assess the patient’s
probability of death (expressed as a percentage between
Fig. 1. Study design (see text for details). PPS, Palliative Performance Scale.
Table 1
Patient demographics.
Age, years N Z 184
Median 64
Min 25
Max 92
Gender N Z 178
Male 107 (60%)
Race/Ethnicity N Z 184
White 139 (75%)
Black 19 (10%)
Hispanic 20 (11%)
Education level N Z 175
High School 79 (45%)
College 96 (55%)
Diagnosis N Z 171
Localized cancer 36 (21%)
Metastatic cancer 119 (69%)
No cancer 16 (9%)
Pain levels (score: 0e10) N Z 177
Mean 2.62
Median 0
Min 0
Max 10
% of patients without pain 52% (N Z 92)
% of patients with mild pain (1e4) 20% (N Z 36)
% of patients with moderate pain (5e7) 14% (N Z 24)
% of patients with severe pain (8e10) 14% (N Z 25)
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days/months of expected survival). These models were
SUPPORT [18] and Palliative Performance Scale (PPS)
[19]. However, because many of the variables in the
SUPPORT model are not routinely collected in the end-
of-life setting, few predictions were based on the SUP-
PORT model.
To avoid value-induced bias [20], we did not present
the prognostic information to the patients until after
their preferences were elicited. We elicited patients’
preferences using regret-based Dual Visual Analog Scale
(DVAS) [11]. DVAS is specifically designed to be used in
the context of the threshold model; DVAS is particularly
suitable for high-stake decisions that are not easily
reversible. Under such circumstances, people mostly rely
on anticipatory regret to guide their decisions; antici-
pation of regret leads to more vigilant decisions, which
in turn is expected to decrease post-decisional regret
[21,22]. DVAS consists of two easily understood ques-
tions designed to elicit regret of omission versus regret of
commission: 1) ‘On a scale 0 to 100, where 0 indicates no
regret and 100 the maximum regret you can feel, how
would you rate the level of your regret if you were not
referred to hospice but instead continued to receive
unnecessary treatment ?’ and 2) ‘On a scale 0 to 100,
where 0 indicates no regret and 100 the maximum regret
you can feel, how would you rate the level of your regret
if you were referred to hospice instead of continuing to
receive necessary life-prolonging treatment ?’ (see
Appendix for the actual regret-elicitation script).
According to the threshold model [10,11,14], there
must be some probability of death (pD) at which a pa-
tient in the terminal phase of life is indifferent (at
‘threshold,’ T) between choosing hospice care versus
continuing treatment of their disease (‘curative/life-
prolonging’ treatment), the choice of either of which can
be regretted. If pD  T, then the patient should choose
hospice care; if pD < T, the patient should opt for
treatment [10,11]. pD is estimated using predictive
models such as those described previously; T is related
to DVAS-elicited preferences according to [10,11]:
TZ
1
1þ Regret of Omission
Regret of CommissionBy empirically eliciting values about regret towards
each of these options, we can determine a relationship
between pD and T [11] and predict the patient’s choice.
Thus, according to the regret threshold model, agree-
ment with the choice of hospice versus treatment rep-
resents the patient’s true preferences.
After eliciting regret values and contrasting pD
against T, we presented the model prediction to each of
the patients who consented to the study. We started the
conversation by first conveying the message in the
following way: ‘based on what you told us about which
treatment you would regret more and our assessment of
how long you have to live, we think that you seem to
prefer to receive care through hospice rather than
treatment X (or, you seem to prefer to receive further
care as treatment X rather than being referred to hos-
pice).’ We then asked the patient if she/he agreed with
our suggestions/recommendations (see Appendix).
Table 2
Patients’ comprehension and satisfaction with the preference elicitation interview process.
The question/statement Responsea (N; %)
The patients’ comprehension of regret of omissionb (1 Z major
problem in understanding the question; 7Z perfect understanding)
(N Z 95)
1Z 0%; 2Z 2 (2%); 3Z 9 (9%); 4Z 26 (27%); 5Z 36 (38%); 6Z 22
(23%); 7 Z 0%b (median Z 5; range: 2e6)
The patients’ comprehension of regret of commissionb (1 Z major
problem in understanding the question; 7Z perfect understanding)
(N Z 95)
1Z 0%; 2Z 3 (3%); 3Z 9 (9%); 4Z 25 (26%); 5Z 35 (36%); 6Z 23
(24%); 7 Z 0%b (median Z 5; range: 2e6)
‘Do you find this information helpful?’ (Yes/No/Unsure)c (N Z 178) Yes Z 109 (61%); no Z 7 (4%); unsure Z 62 (35%)
‘It was the right decision’d (1Z strongly agree; 3Z neither agree nor
disagree; 5 Z strongly disagree) (N Z 108)
Strongly agree Z 57 (53%); agree Z 43 (40%); neither agree nor
disagree Z 7 (6%); disagree Z 1 (1%); strongly disagree Z 0%
‘I would make the same choice again’d (1 Z strongly agree;
3 Z neither agree nor disagree; 5 Z strongly disagree) (N Z 108)
Strongly agree Z 61 (56%); agree Z 33 (31%); neither agree nor
disagree Z 12 (11%); disagree Z 2(2%); strongly disagree Z 0%
‘The choice did me a lot of harm’d (1 Z strongly agree; 3 Z neither
agree nor disagree; 5 Z strongly disagree) (N Z 108)
Strongly agree Z 1 (1%); agree Z 3 (3%); neither agree nor
disagreeZ 9 (8%); disagreeZ 36(33%); strongly disagreeZ 59 (55%)
‘I regret my choice’ (NZ 108)d/change mind about regret (NZ 178)c
(1 Z strongly agree; 3 Z neither agree nor disagree; 5 Z strongly
disagree)
Strongly agree Z 0 (0%); agree Z 2 (2%); Neither agree nor
disagree Z 6 (6%); disagree Z 41(38%); 59 (55%)
5/178 (3%) of patients changed their assessment of regret level
‘It was a wise choice’d (1 Z strongly agree; 3 Z neither agree nor
disagree; 5 Z strongly disagree) (N Z 108)
Strongly agree Z 53 (49%); agree Z 43 (40%); neither agree nor
disagree Z 10 (9%); disagree Z 2(2%); strongly disagree Z 0%
a The numbers may not add to 100% due to rounding error.
b Data available from the last 95 patients as this assessment was not included at the start of the study.
c Data available from the last 95 patients as this assessment was not included at the close of the interview.
d At the one month of follow-up (the patients not interviewed died between the interview and the follow-up call).
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ested in learning the actual prognostic estimates related
to their life expectancy/probability of survival, which
was typically the case. To avoid framing effect [23], we
presented data as survival probability (i.e. the percent-
age of surviving as predicted by the prognostic model),
probability of death (the percentage of dying as pre-
dicted by the prognostic model) and life expectancy (in
days/months). We then re-iterated the process as many
times as the patient desired, but most patients made
their decision during the first round of the interview and
rarely revised their level of regret (Table 2). Although
the patients and their referring physicians enrolled in the
study because they had not settled on the desired course
of action, given the nature of their disease, the majority
of patients who found themselves in the end-of-life
setting had already given some thought as to how they
wanted to spend the remaining days of their lives. We,
therefore, also asked the patients about their initial
inclination towards the choice of hospice versus
continuing treatment (and before administrating
DVAS); we did this to assess the differential effect of
regret model above and beyond the patient’s commit-
ment to one course of action over another.
To assess the descriptive validity of the regret model,
we used a Likert scale (1e7 or 1e5) to ascertain the
patients’ comprehension and their satisfaction with the
process by responding to the following statements/
questions: a) ‘Do you find this information helpful?’ and
b) ‘How strongly do you agree with our best advice?’ We
also used Decision Regret Scale (DRS) [24] to assess the
post-decisional regret in follow-up via telephone on a
monthly basis until the patient’s death. DRS consists of
the following questions: a) ‘It was the right decision,’ b)‘I regret the choice that was made,’ c) ‘I would go for the
same choice if I had to do it over again,’ d) ‘The decision
did a lot of harm to me,’ e) ‘The decision was a wise
one.’ Because all our patients were aware of the terminal
nature of their disease, we also predicted that default
choice (hospice) would lead to the lower overall post-
decisional regret than treatment strategy (change from
the default) [21]. Fig 1 shows overall study design. A
web version of the regret-based decision making tool
can be accessed at: https://hsccf.hsc.usf.edu/ebm/.
2.3. Statistical analysis
Descriptive statistics were used to summarize the data
on patient demographics and disease features. Pearson
correlation and Cramer’s V statistics were used to assess
the agreement between the regret model recommenda-
tions, the patients’ agreement with recommendations,
and the actual choice about the enrolment into hospice
versus decision to receive ‘curative/life-prolonging’
treatment. To determine the overall accuracy of the
regret model, we also constructed receiver-operating
characteristic (ROC) curve and calculated area under
curve (AUC) of association between two variables
tested. We employed the intention-to-treat analysis as in
some cases patients, e.g., may have wished to receive
treatment but in the judgements of their doctors that
was not possible (e.g. high bilirubin preventing admin-
istration of chemotherapy). The nonparametric Man-
neWhitney test was used to assess for the differences in
post-decisional regret. We also performed a multivari-
able logistic regression analysis to assess the association
of age, gender, race/ethnicity, type of diagnosis, pain
level at the time of the interview, effect of initial decision
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the probability of choosing hospice care. Because of the
estimated high event rate (death), we assumed that be-
tween 170 and 200 patients would provide adequate
power for the main goals of the analysis [25].
We also performed external validation of PPS model
by calculating measures of discrimination (the ability of
PPS to distinguish between different risk groups) and
calibration (the accuracy of the prediction) at different
time points [26]. For discrimination at specific time
points, we used the area under the ROC curve. Model
calibration was tested using methods as reported by
Royston [27]. All statistical analyses were performed in
STATA statistical software (version 14) [28].
All patients signed informed consent before partici-
pation in the study. Our study was approved by the USF
institutional review board (#Study ID: Pro00000220).
3. Results
Between March 1, 2013 and November 30, 2015, we
approached 1052 consecutive patients meeting eligibility
criteria. One hundred eighty-four patients consented to
the study, of whom 178 patients agreed to all aspects of
the study (six patients consented to data collection but
not to the interview). The low consent rate is indicative
of the intense emotional state of the patients and theirScreened
N=1052
Excluded N=864
Withdrew N=4
Included
N=184
PaƟent
N=170
Surrogate
N=8
Hospice
N=106
Treatment
N=72
Post Decisional Regret
N=108
PaƟent
N=81
Surrogate
N=27
Data only: N=6
Included 
DVAS
N=178
Fig. 2. The flowchart of overall patient enrolment. DVAS, Dual
Visual Analog Scale.families when decisions on end-of-life treatment have to
be made. Of 178 interviews, 170 were completed by the
patients and eight by the patient surrogates. Fig. 2
shows the study flow. As of the last follow-up
(December 31, 2015), 97% (172) of patients of the 178
patients were dead. Because the results remained iden-
tical when the data based on the interview with the
surrogates (N Z 8) were dropped from the analysis, we
report all analyses based on the full data set (NZ 178).
Table 1 shows patient demographics. Median age of
patients was 64 years (range 25e92) of whom 60% were
males; most patients were white (75%) and college
educated (55%). The majority of patients had cancer
(91%). Pain was well controlled at the time of the
interview in the majority of patients (72% of patients
[NZ 128] had had either mild pain or were free of pain).
Median time of the interview was 23 min (range:
5e60 min; N Z 177). Eighty-eight perecnt (158/179) of
patients received the material about hospice at the time
of consent, which they reviewed before the interview.
Fig. 3 shows discrimination and calibration statistics
of the PPS model at various time points. The estimates
of the area under ROC curve at days 30, 60, 90 and 120
show good discrimination (AUC ranged from 0.70 to
0.81). The plot of the predicted versus observed proba-
bility for high versus low probability of survival
(Fig. 3a) and test calibration slope Z 1 (the slope did
not statistically significantly deviated from 1) (Fig. 3b)
also show that the model is well calibrated.
Fig. 4 shows the patients’ agreement with the regret
model recommendations related to hospice referral
versus further treatment. Eighty-five percent (151/178)
of patients agreed with the model’s recommendations
(Pearson chi-square test Z 150.62; p < 0.000001;
Cramer’s V Z 0.92; AUC Z 0.845). In fact, in no
instance did the patients disagree with the proposed
recommendations, but 15% (27/178) of patients were
unsure about the suggested course of action.
If the model is descriptively correct, then we would
expect that the patients would demonstrate comprehen-
sion of the questions asked during the interview and find
the entire process of eliciting their preferences useful.
Table 2 shows the results indicating the descriptive val-
idity of themodel. Themajority of patients comprehended
the DVAS regret questionnaire with no difficulties, which
is probably why only 3% (5/178) of patients changed their
minds about their level of regret at the end of the inter-
view. In addition, the follow-up assessment demonstrated
that fewpatients foundourmethods harmful (4%) andnot
helpful (4%). The vast majority of patients found that the
interview and regret-based elicitation of their preferences
were very helpful to enable them to make ‘the right and
wise’ decision (93% and 89%, respectively), which they
rarely regretted (2%) and would choose again (87%).
Because what people say often differs from what
people actually do, and to evaluate if the model is pre-
scriptively correct, we also assessed the agreement of the
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Fig. 3. External validation of Palliative Performance Scale (PPS) model: discrimination and calibration statistics. Calibration of PPS with
the prognostic index was estimated from the derivation data set and evaluated on the validation data set with reestimation of the baseline
cumulative-hazard function. Smooth curves represented predicted survival probabilities, and vertical capped lines represent
KaplaneMeier estimates with 95% confidence interval. Two prognostic groups are plotted: The ‘Good’ survival group (dark line), and the
‘Poor’ survival group (pale line) (a). (b) Summary estimates of discrimination (area under curve [AUC]) and calibration statistics. (Note
that AUC above 0.7 is typically considered that the model discriminates well between different risk groups such as the probability of death
and the lack of statistical significance for the slope between observed versus predicted probability of death indicated that the model was
well calibrated.)
Agreement with the model
recommendaƟons 
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
80.00%
90.00%
100.00%
erusnUecipsoHtnemtaerT
Ag
re
em
en
t (
%
)
Treatment Hospice
n=86
n=13
n=65
n=14
Fig. 4. The patients’ agreement with the regret model recommendations. Eighty-five percent (151/178) of patients agreed with the model’s
recommendations (Pearson chi-square test Z 150.62; p < 0.000001; Cramer’s V Z 0.92; AUC Z 0.845).
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treatment versus hospice referral (Fig. 5). The regret
model predicted the actual choices for 72% (128/178) of
patients (Pearson chi-square test Z 32.2473;
p < 0.00001; Crame´r’s V Z 0.43; AUC Z 0.715).
As explained, the patients eligible for our study were
all aware of the terminal nature of their disease and themajority were given information about hospice services
before elicitation of their preferences about the man-
agement choices. This means that at the time they con-
sented to our study, patients had already contemplated
the choice between hospice and treatment continuation.
Although all patients expressed desire to discuss avail-
able management choices, 81 patients (45%) were
Agreement of the model recommendaƟons
with the actual choice 
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Fig. 5. Agreement of the regret model recommendations with the patients’ actual choice. The regret model predicted the actual choices for
72% (128/178) of patients (Pearson chi-square test Z 32.2473; p < 0.00001; Crame´r’s V Z 0.43; AUC Z 0.715).
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who were thinking about further treatment versus 46
(26%) who were ‘not sure’ about further management
before the interview. To further assess how the initial
disposition towards hospice affects the actual decision to
choose hospice, we performed a multivariate logistic
regression. As seen in Table 3, the only two variables
that were statistically significantly associated with the
probability of hospice choice were initial disposition
towards hospice care (odds ratio [OR] Z 6.5; 95% CI:Table 3
Probability of choosing hospice: the results of multivariate analysisa (see a
Actual choice Odds ratio Standard error z
Age 1.018204 0.0175367 1
Cancer
1 0.5155111 0.4237897 e
2 0.9123048 0.6650747 e
2. Gender 1.584483 0.6829094 1
2. Education 0.4428064 0.1901731 e
Race
1 0.3054635 0.2256433 e
2 1.582397 1.101463 0
Pain Level 1.10984 0.0787249 1
initialDecision (hospice)c
1 0.2865171 0.2094535 e
2 6.494877 4.9722148 2
1. Recommendationd 6.326332 4.777488 2
initialDecision#recommendationb
1 1 1.992873 2.25027 0
2 1 0.195565 0.2010871 e
_cons 0.2202322 0.2986847 e
Logistic regression Number of obs Z 165. LR c2(13) Z 66.18. Prob > c2
a HosmereLemeshow test shows a good fit: c2(8) Z 12.02; prob > c2 Z
b Testing for interactions between ‘initialDecision’ and ‘recommendation’ w
c Reference category Z not sure; 1 Z inclined towards treatment; 2 Z i
d Reference category Z recommend treatment.1.45e29.12 with respect to ‘Not Sure’) and regret model
recommendation for hospice (OR Z 6.3; 95% CI:
1.43e27.8 with respect to ‘recommend treatment’).
Fig. 6 shows the probability of choosing hospice care as
a function of these two variables. People who were
initially inclined to choose hospice, rarely changed their
minds, while those who were ‘not sure’ or were inclined
towards treatment often changed their minds in favour
of hospice care as a result of regret model
recommendations.lso Table 1).
P > z 95% confidence interval Interval
.05 0.295 0.9844059 1.053162
0.81 0.42 0.1029165 2.582207
0.13 0.9 0.2185797 3.807764
.07 0.286 0.6808026 3.687686
1.9 0.058 0.1908299 1.027499
1.61 0.108 0.0718098 1.299376
.66 0.51 0.4044056 6.191752
.47 0.142 0.9657879 1.275379
1.71 0.087 0.0683744 1.200624
.44 0.015 1.448553 29.12109
.44 0.015 1.439945 27.79445
.61 0.541 0.2179407 18.22305
1.59 0.113 0.0260648 1.46733
1.12 0.265 0.0154333 3.1427
Z 0.0000.Log likelihood Z e78.715972.
0.1502.
as not statistically significant at conventional p< 0.05 value (pZ 0.07).
nclined towards hospice care.
Probability of choosing hospice
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Fig. 6. Probability of choosing hospice care as a function of (a) model recommendations and (b) model recommendations and inclination
towards choosing hospice before the actual interview. The terminally ill patients aware of the status of their disease and who before the
interview inclined to select hospice and had low regret of choosing it had high probability actually being referred to hospice.
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the patient’s choices 30 days after the original prefer-
ences elicitation. Fig. 7 shows that people who chose
hospice had lower median post-decisional score of 5
(range: 0e55) than those who selected active treatment
in the final days of their lives (median 15; range: 0 to 70;
p Z 0.05).
4. Discussion
About 2.6 million people died in the United States of
America in 2014 and 55 million worldwide [2]. Many of
them did not experience a ‘good’ death, mostly due to
poor discussion about prognosis, and failure to elicit
patients’ preferences about how they would like to livePost-decisional regret
Median regret score: 15 (Rx) vs. 5 (Hospice); p=0.05
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Fig. 7. Post-decisional regret as measured by Decision Regret
Scale. Note that post-decisional regret was lower in patients who
selected hospice than in those who chose further active treatment.the final days of life. Inadequate care at the end of life
often results in delayed referral to hospice services, and
this remains the key barrier to better end-of-life care [1].
According to US Medicare regulations, patients are
eligible for hospice care if their estimated survival is of
less than 6 months and they choose palliation over
disease-directed treatment [29]. However, median sur-
vival of patients referred to hospice is typically very
short from 17.4 days to about 6 days in some studies
[26]dindicating that patients often cannot reap the
benefits of hospice services because they are referred to
hospice only when death is imminent. Recently advo-
cated system changes such as incentives for physicians to
spend more time counselling patients and families, im-
provements in palliative training with an aim towards
delivering patient-centred, family-oriented end-of-life
care [1] will certainly improve the care of terminally ill
patients.
However, in the final analysis it is the lack of easy-to-
use appropriate tools that can reliably elicit patient
preferences about the choices they face that has
hampered better care at the end of life. In this paper, we
report an empirical study using such a tool. We relied on
regret approach as a dominant decision-making process
in the most consequential decisions that people can
facedmaking their decisions on how to live when their
life journey approaches the end [8,12,13]. We showed
that a simple tool consisting of two easily understood
questions about regret of omission versus regret of
commission [11] (that is at the heart of regret threshold
model), is both descriptively and prescriptively valid.
The patients enrolled in the study appreciated the help
they received and found that recommendations about
their care choices based on the model were highly
consistent with their true values and preferences. At the
B. Djulbegovic et al. / European Journal of Cancer 68 (2016) 27e37 35same time, our model demonstrated high predictive
power related to the patient’s actual choice about hos-
pice versus receiving further treatment. Most testing of
decision models described in literature so far has relied
on hypothetical, vignette-based scenarios in healthy
people. This is the first time that a theoretical decision
model has been satisfactorily tested in a real-life setting
in people who actually face the very decision that model
was designed to address.
Most interesting, when we evaluated the factors that
can potentially be useful for improving referral to hos-
pice, we found that only two factors (initial inclination
towards hospice care and regret model recommendation
for choosing hospice over treatment) had high statisti-
cally significant association with the actual choice of
hospice care. As shown in Table 3, if the patient had an
initial inclination towards hospice, there is 6.5 times
higher odds that s/he would actually be enrolled in
hospice over those patients who were not sure how they
want to spend the remaining time of their lives. If in
addition to being inclined towards hospice, the patient
actually prefers hospice over treatment, there is close to
98% probability that this patient will actually opt for
hospice care [p Z combined odds/(1 þ combined
odds)Z 97.6% (where combined oddsZ odds of initial
inclination towards choosing hospice  odds of
choosing hospice according to the regret model]. Here, it
is important to note that the patients who actually
elected to have hospice care had lower post-decisional
regret on DRS scale than those people who wanted to
be treated, which typically included chemotherapy
associated with adverse events, often leading to lower
quality of life.
Interestingly, in a recent systematic review on the
application of DRS in health care, which we used to
assess post-decisional regret, Becerra Perez et al. [30]
found that the median DRS score was 14.3 (standard
deviation 2.2e34.5) across 59 studies in various health
care settings. While many of the conditions studied in
the literature are serious ones, none of them come close
in consequentiality as those that are experienced by
people whose lives are coming to an end. And, yet, the
level of regret we observed in people who selected
treatment (Fig. 5) was about the same as in diseases such
as screening for melanoma, adjuvant treatment for
breast cancer, fertility preservation etc. [30]. Most
importantly, the regret experienced by people who chose
hospice was much lower than the regret observed in
patients who faced treatment choices for many other
health conditions (Fig. 5). This observation is consistent
with Decision Justification Theory, according to which
‘default’ choices are easier to justify leading to lower
regret [21,31].
Aristotle posited that the test of a good life is found
in the absence of deathbed regrets [32]. It could be that
once patients fully accept the reality that their lives are
indeed coming to an end, and that further disease-oriented treatment is not alleviating suffering, accep-
tance of hospice facilitates the ultimate goal of that each
human presumably seeks: a peaceful, graceful exit of a
life well-lived, with no regrets of unfulfilled potential
weighing on the soul.
Although we believe we devised a tool that can
improve decision making in the end-of-life setting, our
study is not without limitations. Considerable research
over several decades indicates that many factors deter-
mine peoples’ decisions. In general, these factors are
classified as the effect of a) context or framing
(e.g. people may make different decisions when identical
information is presented in terms of gains versus losses),
b) situational or contextual factors (e.g. emotions, pain,
time pressure, cognitive load, social context), and c)
individual characteristics of a decision maker [33,34].
These individual characteristics reflect such things as
diverse cultural background, race/ethnicity, educational/
numeracy level [35,36], and decision-making styles
(i.e. intuitive versus deliberative reflective of dual pro-
cessing theories) [33,34,37,38].
By presenting information in different formats and
allowing as much time as possible, we successfully
controlled for the effect of framing and time pressure.
By using regret approach we aimed to activate both
affect and deliberative aspects of dual processing deci-
sion making [13,38]. We decided against additional data
collection to avoid interfering with clinical care and to
avoid the extra burden on patients who found them-
selves in an already difficult phase of life. Our goal was
to codify good medical practice while developing a new
tool to facilitate end-of-life decisions that can be easily
integrated into clinical workflow. Although we did not
restrict time for discussion, we found that the median
time for patients to decide on hospice versus continuing
treatment was 23 min. That is, in patients who are aware
of their terminal disease, further clarification of the way
they wish to spend their remaining days can be easily
accomplished within the typical time allotted to medical
practitioners.
The fact that age, gender, race, college education, or
pain level had no effect on the actual choice indicates
that numeracy skills or cultural background do not
appear to be as important for end-of-life decision
making, while regret and inclination towards hospice are
(Table 3). Nevertheless, we note that reflective of Tampa
Bay demographics [39], the majority of patients con-
sented to our study (75%) were whites. That is, it does
not appear that we have selectively enrolled one racial
group over another. Nevertheless, the future studies
should attempt to enrol larger proportions of non-
whites to evaluate more decisively if cultural back-
ground, religion, race, and ethnicity affect regret. We
believe this will be unlikely because regret is a uniquely
human emotion, which appears to be easily understood
by people of all races and background regardless how it
is elicited [13,40].
B. Djulbegovic et al. / European Journal of Cancer 68 (2016) 27e3736Finally, we should note that only 17% of eligible
patients actually consented to our study raising the issue
of generalisability of our findings. How well will our
approach perform in other settings can only be
addressed in the future research aiming to replicate our
findings. Nevertheless, we should note that 17% of
enrolment is not unusual in clinical research; the non-
enrolment rates vary from 0% to 90% [41,42]with some
studies reporting enrolment of only 1 patient for 68
patients screened [43]. Therefore, we believe that our
study is typical of contemporary human study research.
In conclusion, we report empirical validation of
regret threshold model, which can easily be used in
clinical practice and which can facilitate decision mak-
ing in the end-of-life setting. The methods we employed
both respect the patients’ preferences and have a po-
tential to decrease unnecessary aggressive care at the end
of life [44].Conflict of interest statement
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